DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 219 751 CS 206 938

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TITLE An Examination of Prepropaganda and Political Change in Afghanistan during a National Crisis--September, 1979-January, 1980.
PUB DATE Jul 82
NOTE 21p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism (65th, Athens, OH, July 25-28, 1982).

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Authoritarianism; Content Analysis; Developing Nations; *Media Research; Newspapers; *News Reporting; *Press Opinion; *Propaganda
IDENTIFIERS Afghanistan; *Ellul (Jacques); Media Role

ABSTRACT

Jacques Ellul defined "prepropaganda" as the subtle and sophisticated use of news services to improve an authoritarian government's public image. Because its value is directly related to its being used sparingly, he predicted that prepropaganda would increase when an authoritarian government felt threatened and decrease when it once more felt secure. The sovereignty threatening events in Afghanistan from September 1979 until January 1980 provided an opportunity to test Ellul's theory. According to the theory, the frequency and the bias of the prepropaganda directed at Hafizullah Amin, Afghanistan's ruler, by Bakhtar, the official news service, should have changed according to the vicissitudes of the situation, being favorable during the planning of the Soviet Union's invasion and unfavorable after that invasion took place. Content analysis of the favorable and unfavorable adjectives used to describe Amin in articles supplied by Bakhtar for editions of the "Kabul Times" (origirally written in Farsi and translated into English) provided the data for the study. Results of the data analysis confirmed Ellul's theory. In addition, the paper's use of photographs and headlines followed the same pattern. The results seem to imply that changes in prepropaganda within authoritarian news services may reveal the direction of changing political environments to outside analysts. (JL)

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An Examination of Prepropaganda and Political Change in Afghanistan During a National Crisis -- September, 1979 - January, 1980

By Robert Logan and James Hayes

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Paper submitted to the International Division, Association for Education in Journalism, for the 1982 National Convention, Athens, Ohio.

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Introduction

In his book Propaganda, Jacques Ellul observed that the nature of propaganda had changed in some authoritarian nations to a more subtle utilization of official news services to improve the government's public image, which he termed "prepropaganda."[1] The use of news services for prepropaganda purposes, De Sola Pool revealed, was a result of a new political awareness and media sophistication that authoritarian governments attained after World War II.[2] Some authoritarian governments found that the excessive use of propaganda occasionally reinforced pre-existing public doubts about government leadership, rather than changing popular opinion. As a result, some public officials began to look for new strategies to manage public opinion that were more subtle and less obtrusive than propaganda techniques.[3] Rao found that some authoritarian governments turned to news services to convey administrative protocols because news was not publicly perceived as propaganda - in comparison with editorials or official communiques.[4] Hence, the use of news services to camouflage governmental schemes was conceived as a restrained alternative to "hard line" propaganda.

In addition, Ellul and De Sola Pool revealed that prepropaganda's success in formulating public opinion depended to some extent upon its eschewal by governmental authorities.[5] Ellul wrote that prepropaganda was designed to be unmanifest in authoritarian news services and was most effective when it was used sparingly. Thus, increases or decreases in prepropaganda reflected a government's need to manage public opinion in relation to national or international events.[6] That is, an authoritarian government would be motivated

to use more prepropaganda if its political security was threatened by challenges to its sovereignty, or would be motivated to use less prepropaganda under more politically advantageous circumstances.[7] In more formal terms, prepropaganda would increase in authoritarian countries if the national political atmosphere was unfavorable to the government's administrative sovereignty. On the other hand, prepropaganda would decrease in authoritarian countries if the national political atmosphere was favorable to the government's administrative sovereignty.

Thus, a change in the political status quo in a prepropaganda-oriented, authoritarian nation was seen by Ellul to have a predictable impact on the frequency of bias injected into an official news service. Ellul's ideas, in turn, provided a theoretical framework for researchers to prognosticate changes in prepropaganda-oriented news services based on a qualitative knowledge of political fluctuations inside some authoritarian nations.

But Ellul's ideas have never been systematically explored by scholars--perhaps because there have been few germane opportunities to ascertain the degree of interaction between authoritarian politics and prepropaganda. Although many authoritarian governments have undergone well documented, sovereignty-threatening political changes, few authoritarian societies have a well established tradition of prepropaganda which has withstood political transformations and remained the primary source of news, after leadership changes. In fact, the only examples of authoritarian nations with prepropaganda-type news services which have undergone extensive political changes include Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.[8]

Within a four-month period from September, 1979-January, 1980, however, three sovereignty-threatening political changes occurred in Afghanistan, which, theoretically, should have resulted in significant

changes in Afghanistan's news service.[9] Thus, the events surrounding the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan provide a rare opportunity to explore if sovereignty-threatening political events affect the frequency of prepropaganda in an authoritarian setting. In addition, Afghanistan's prepropaganda-oriented official news service, Bakhtar, has served as a restrained link between Afghan governments and the nation through several changes in governments in recent years.[10] Bakhtar's function has been to report on routine national-governmental events and to prepare the Afghan public for possible changes by occasionally rallying public opinion.[11] In other words, there has never been an open communication of controversial government intentions in Afghanistan, as in most authoritarian nations. Changes in government policy, if revealed at all, have surfaced via subtle efforts to influence public opinion in the news service. Therefore, Afghanistan would seem to be an appropriate setting to explore if the changes in Afghan politics were reflected in subsequent changes in Bakhtar, as Ellul projected.

Methodologically, the study analyzed the political history of Afghanistan in order to generate hypotheses concerning Bakhtar's performance. The actual insertion of bias, or prepropaganda, within Bakhtar's routine news coverage was then measured to determine if Ellul's theory could be verified within a changing political environment.

Historical Review and Hypotheses

Under Ellul's proposal, different media strategies to mold public opinion should be contingent on the nature of changing political climates that occurred in Afghanistan during the months just before and after the

Soviet invasion. If Ellul is correct, changes in the frequency and tone in Bakhtar, Afghanistan's official news source, should have coincided with the major shifts in the political status of Afghan governments from September, 1979-January, 1980. Briefly, Afghanistan's political history during the period underwent three changes including: a period of relative stability for the government of Hafizullah Amin (from June-mid-October, 1979); a period in which the Amin's administrative sovereighty was threatened by a superpower (from mid-October-December 25, 1979); plus an invasion by the Soviet Union and the formation of a new government (after December 26, 1979). By linking the changes in Afghanistan's political history with the theoretical direction proposed by Ellul, the following hypotheses were suggested for study:

1. The frequency of pro-Amin prepropaganda, or opinions favorable to Amin in Bakhtar, should have increased significantly after the Soviets began to plan their invasion (following mid-October, 1979) in comparison with the frequency of pro-Amin prepropaganda when Amin's political future was more secure (from June-mid-October, 1979).

2. The frequency of anti-Amin prepropaganda, or opinions unfavorable to Amin in Bakhtar, should not have increased significantly after the Soviets began to plan their invasion (following mid-October, 1979) in comparison with the frequency of anti-Amin prepropaganda when Amin's political future was more secure (from June-mid-October, 1979).

3. Anti-Amin prepropaganda, or opinions unfavorable to Amin in Bakhtar, should have increased signiticantly following the successful Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (after December 25, 1979) in comparison

with the two political eras that were dominated by Amin's leadership (June-mid-October, 1979; mid-October-December 25, 1979).

4. Pro-Amin propaganda, or opinions favorable to Amin in Bakhtar, should have decreased significantly following the successful Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (after December 25, 1979) in comparison with the two political eras that were dominated by Amin's leadership (June-mid-October, 1979; mid-October-December 25, 1979).

The hypotheses were derived from evidence of the political challenges that Afghan governments faced during the period in question. A brief history of the era, thus, follows along with the hypotheses generated from each span of political change.

For instance, during the first era of political change in Afghanistan, from June-mid-October, 1979, the new pro-Communist government, led by Hafizullah Amin, displayed a surprising independence from the influence of the Soviet Union.[12] Harrison writes that Amin's administration was able to isolate pro-Soviet forces within the Afghan government and ingratiate itself with other political adversaries.[13] Afghanistan's political atmosphere from June, 1979-mid-October, 1979 was dominated, in turn, by an incumbent administration that was slowly gaining diplomatic and political sovereignty over Afghan internal affairs and its rivals.

But Valenta adds that Amin's government was forced to be rather cautious and seemingly indecisive in order to accomplish its expropriation of power inside the country.[14] Harrison writes that Amin's administration inherited and honored a national political tradition of caution and subtlety in pressing its political advantages over diverse political, religious and tribal interests in Afghanistan.[15] Hence, if Ellul's theory

is correct, Amin's early political success and cautious approach should have been reflected in somewhat restrained uses of prepropaganda in Afghanistan's news service.

Amin's political honeymoon ended quickly, however, when the Soviet Union quietly lost confidence in Amin's leadership in mid-October, 1979, and began to formulate contingency plans to invade Afghanistan.[16] Harrison explains that rumors of Soviet military interference in Afghan internal affairs changed the political balance of power in Afghanistan overnight and rapidly eroded Amin's political control of the country.[17] Amin's internal opposition, which had been rather subdued since his ascent to power, quickly became more diplomatically active in seeking Soviet aid to depose Amin's government.[18] Under these circumstances, Harrison writes, Amin had no political alternative but to try to consolidate new levels of public support for his administration.[19] Yet, Valenta writes that Amin was forced to remain publicly diplomatic towards the Soviets--plus pro-Soviet forces--inside Afghanistan to avoid precipitating an invasion.[20] (Amin, apparently, was not willing to undermine the possibility of a political compromise by openly criticizing his enemies.) Accordingly, Amin's efforts to unify his insecure power base should have resulted in significantly increased efforts to generate more pro-Amin prepropaganda in Bakhtar, from about mid-October, 1979 until the end of his administration -- on December 25, 1979.

Moss notes that Soviet strategists decided to move geographically closer to Iran and end the influence of both Amin's regime and his political faction (the Khalq sect) in Afghanistan by mid-December, 1979.[21]

The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was to take advantage of an increasingly uncertain political situation in Iran plus the Politboro's annoyance with Amin's increasing disregard for Moscow's perogatives.[22] Soviet irritation with Amin's leadership was particularly exacerbated by the disappearance of several high-level Soviet military advisors while on maneuvers with Amin's army in mid-December, 1979.[23]

Talbott emphasizes that Soviet policy intentions were unequivocal at the time of the invasion.[24] The Kremlin wished to malign Amin's leadership in order to justify to the Afghan public, their allies (and perhaps themselves) that the violation of Afghanistan's frontier was to "save" the country from a tyrant and install a more responsible government.[25] Meanwhile, the new administration, under the leadership of Babrak Karmal, took power on December 25, 1979 with an unprecedented political and military opportunity to suppress its adversaries. The presence of Soviet troops made the Karmal regime quite powerful, but did not ensure the government's absolute political sovereignty in Afghanistan.[26] In fact, the controversial nature of the Karmal administration's ascent to power probably made any form of pro-Karmal political expression unwise in Afghanistan.[27] Hence, the new uncertainty in Afghan politics should have resulted in significant increases in anti-Amin prepropaganda plus significant decreases in pro-Amin prepropaganda in Bakhtar. By not calling attention to itself, the new Karmal government would stand a better chance of public acceptance.

Methods

To investigate the hypotheses, content analysis was used to study all articles supplied by Bakhtar, Afghanistan's official news service, in Tuesday and Saturday editions of the Kabul Times during the most critical period of political change in Afghanistan. The investigation examined newspapers printed from September 11, 1979 to January 10, 1980, which spanned the period during Amin's secure political environment, through the political uncertainty that preceded the Soviet invasion and included the political changes after the installation of the Karmal government.

All the Bakhtar articles that were investigated were originally written in Farsi but printed in English. The Kabul Times is an English language newspaper for the diplomatic and foreign community in Afghanistan. The authors obtained translations of Bakhtar stories from Farsi into English to assure that news reports in the Kabul Times were identical to the reports broadcast in Afghanistan on the same day.[28] Tuesday and Saturday editions were chosen because they contained a higher frequency of news-editorial materials than other daily issues.

The frequency of prepropaganda, or bias injected, in Bakhtar's news reports was ascertained by measuring the total number of adjectives found in news accounts that were favorable or unfavorable to H. Amin, Afghanistan premier until December 25, 1979. Opinions favorable or unfavorable towards Amin became the directional focus in the study because of the consensus among Afghan scholars that Amin's personality and leadership dominated the era in question.[29] In addition, Merrill found that the frequency of adjectives favorable or unfavorable to national leaders was an excellent indicator of bias, or prepropaganda, in news services.[30] Merrill acknowledged

that adverbs or phrases were also indicators of bias in news stories. They were not measured in this study because of their stylistic infrequency in Bakhtar.

Six coders determined whether adjectives were favorable or unfavorable towards Amin via an index of favorability or unfavorability proposed by Budd, Thorp and Donohew.[32] Intercoder reliability was about 99 percent, which probably reflected the unequivocal nature of Bakhtar's references.[33]

For comparative purposes, the frequency of adjectives was tabulated into six three-week segments that encompass the time frame in the study. The number of adjectives favorable to or unfavorable to Amin in each three-week segment are displayed in Table 1.

Results

(Table 1 about here)

Data relating to the frequency of prepropaganda, or adjectives favorable or unfavorable to Amin in Bakhtar from September 11, 1979-January 10, 1980 are displayed in Table 1. Data show that 25 adjectives favorable to Amin were found in Bakhtar during the first three-week period measured and increased to 38 in the next three weeks, during the most politically secure era in his administration. The frequency of adjectives favorable to Amin fell slightly, to 24, from October 27-November 8, 1979, after Amin first received word of the Soviet threat to his political autonomy. But, the frequency of pro-Amin adjectives increased rapidly and consistently during the next six weeks, to 44, then 62, from November 13, 1979-December 20, 1979. Data reveal there were zero unfavorable adjectives about Amin in Bakhtar during the entire period measured while he was in office, from September 11-December 25, 1979.

Table 1 Bakhtar Adjective Use

	Period of secure political environment for Amin's government		Period of Soviet plans to overthrow Amin's government			After Soviet occupation	TOTAL
	Sept. 11, 1979-Oct. 1, 1979	Oct. 2, 1979-Oct. 22, 1979	Oct. 23, 1979-Nov. 12, 1979	Nov. 13, 1979-Dec. 3, 1979	Dec. 4, 1979-Dec. 28, 1979	Dec. 29, 1979-* Jan. 10, 1980	
Adjectives favorable to Amin in Bakhtar	25	38	24	44	62	0	193
Adjectives unfavorable to Amin in Bakhtar	0	0	0	0	0	44	44

Overall x^2 with 5 degrees of freedom is significant beyond the .001 level and patterns of adjective changes exhibited between categorized time frames are all significantly different beyond the .001 level.[34]

* Issue of December 25, 1979 was not obtainable. Issues after January 19, 1980 were not obtainable.

After the Soviet occupation, from December 25, 1979-January 10, 1980, the number of adjectives favorable to Amin found in Bakhtar's news reports dropped to zero and the number of adjectives unfavorable to Amin suddenly increased to 44.

Although the total number of adjectives used in Bakhtar across all time periods may seem low, it should be noted that prepropaganda is restrained, by nature, to avoid the rhetorical excess of propaganda.

Table I also reveals that all increases and decreases in favorable and unfavorable adjectives exhibited across the categorized time frames were statistically significant at the .001 level. Moreover, Table I indicates that all four hypotheses were supported at the .001 level of significance. The frequency of pro-Amin prepropaganda, or adjectives favorable to Amin in Bakhtar, increased significantly after the Soviets began to plan their invasion (from October 23, 1979-December 20, 1979) in comparison with the frequency of pro-Amin prepropaganda when Amin's political future was more secure (from September 11, 1979-October 18, 1979). Further, the frequency of prepropaganda favorable to Amin in Bakhtar increased significantly during the weeks from November 13, 1979-December 20, 1979.

The frequency of anti-Amin prepropaganda, or adjectives unfavorable to Amin in Bakhtar, did not increase significantly after the Soviets began to plan their invasion (from October 23, 1979-December 20, 1979) in comparison with the frequency of anti-Amin prepropaganda when Amin's future was more secure (from September 11, 1979-October 18, 1979). In fact, there were no indications of adjectives unfavorable to Amin during this entire era.

The frequency of anti-Amin prepropaganda in Bakhtar increased significantly, however, following the successful Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (after December 25, 1979) in comparison with the two political eras that were dominated by Amin's leadership (September 11, 1979-October 18, 1979; October 23, 1979-December 25, 1979). In addition, the frequency of pro-Amin prepropaganda in Bakhtar decreased significantly following the successful Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (after December 25, 1979) in comparison with the two political eras that were dominated by Amin's leadership (September 11, 1979-October 18, 1979; October 23, 1979-December 20, 1979).

Discussion

Evidence of expected increases and decreases in adjectives in Bakhtar in relation to political changes in Afghanistan confirmed that Ellul's theory can be applied in an operant authoritarian context.

It is possible, of course, that Afghan reporters and editors made the changes discovered here without direct government interference or controls. But the extent to which Bakhtar's reporters and editors did respond to perceived or actual governmental pressures should not make a theoretical difference in the findings. Clearly, the frequency of prepropaganda in Bakhtar did respond as predicted to sovereignty-threatening political events in Afghanistan, whether the political pressures on Bakhtar's editors or reporters were overt or covert.

In addition to the results measured and reported in Table 1, the authors also found that photographs and headlines in the Kabul Times seemed to change as the news service became more supportive of Amin after

id-October, 1979 and more opposed to him after Christmas, 1979. The photographs of Amin in the Kabul Times, for instance, grew larger and began to feature Amin in the center of all pictured activities as his political sovereignty was increasingly undermined by Soviet pressure. By late October, 1979, photographs of Amin were, apparently, retouched to make Amin appear physically larger than other persons in the same exposure. Headlines about Amin also increased in size and favoritism during the last weeks of his regime. After the Soviet occupation, the pictures and headlines about Amin were noticeably less numerous and were quite unflattering. Unfortunately, the photographs and headlines in the Kabul Times were too infrequent to use as comparative measures for the entire four-month period at issue in this study. However, relative size and positioning of photographic subjects -- plus headline bias -- might provide excellent dependant variables to compare with changes in political climates in future studies.

Further, the imbalance of power given to the Karmal regime by Soviet troops enabled the new government to begin to change the nature of Afghanistan's press and news service. After Karmal's government assumed power, the Kabul Times was immediately renamed the Kabul New Times and the newspaper quickly became more vindictive and vitriolic than its predecessor. Soviet policy analysts at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School surmised that an entirely new reporting and editing staff was employed to publish the Kabul New Times and Bakhtar, after Karmal's installation.[35]

Finally, the study demonstrated that the frequency of prepropaganda in an official news service was significantly related to the degree of political sovereignty an authoritarian administration enjoys -- in relation to national political events. Actual changes in a prepropaganda-type

news service, apparently, can be predicted on the basis of changing political events in an authoritarian nation -- particularly when the political sovereignty of an incumbent government is stable or unstable. The confirmation of Ellul's ideas, thus, helps fill a need to build a more holistic theory concerning the interaction between authoritarian politics, prepropaganda and premeditation in government efforts to influence public opinion.[36]

Further, it is reasonable to assume that changes in prepropaganda-type news services may also reveal unmanifest political stability or turmoil within authoritarian nations, or forecast unannounced changes in government policy towards political adversaries. The study implies that changes in prepropaganda within authoritarian news services may reveal the direction of changing political environment in an authoritarian nation, which may enable outside observers to anticipate political and policy changes with more assurance than previously imagined. Further research about the techniques deployed in prepropaganda-oriented authoritarian settings may provide the tools to determine internal political changes, in some nations, well before they occur.

Appendix A - Chi Square Table and Calculations

EXPECTED FREQUENCIES ARE PRINTED BELOW OBSERVED FREQUENCIES

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	TOTALS
1	25	38	24	44	62	0	193
	20.4	30.9	19.5	35.8	50.5	35.8	
2	0	0	0	0	0	44	44
	4.6	7.1	4.5	8.2	11.5	8.2	
TOTALS	25	38	24	44	62	44	237

TOTAL CHI SQUARE =

1.06 + 1.61 + 1.02 + 1.86 + 2.62 + 35.83 +
4.64 + 7.05 + 4.46 + 8.17 + 11.51 +157.17 +

= = 237.00

DEGREES OF FREEDOM = (2-1) X (6-1) = 5

NOTE 2 CELLS WITH EXPECTED FREQUENCIES LESS THAN 5

NOTES

[1] Jacques Ellul, Propaganda - The Formation of Men's Attitudes. (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 15-351. An authoritarian government and press system is operationally defined as socio-political domination of information and governmental controls by one political-ideological unit, including the banishment of an official opposition, adopted from John C. Merrill, "A Conceptual View of World Journalism," in Heinz-Dietrich Fisher and John C. Merrill, eds., International and Intercultural Communication, (New York: Hastings House, 1976), pp. 18-28. More subtle propaganda and concern over public opinion has been seen as a distinguishing element in the transition from totalitarian to authoritarian governments in Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1973.)

[2] Ithiel De Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Ithiel De Sola Pool, Wilbur Schramm, et al., ed. Handbook of Communication, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 462-511.

[3] Ellul, op. cit., 15-35.

[4] Y.V. Lakshmana Rao, "Propaganda Through the Printed Media in the Developing Countries," in Alan Wells, ed. Mass Communications - A World View, (Palo Alto: National Press Books, 1974), pp. 247-248.

[5] Ellul, op. cit., pp. 17, 43; De Sola Pool, op. cit., pp. 462-63.

[6] Ibid., pp. 15-75. This is an adaption of Ellul's ideas.

[7] Ibid., pp. 15-75.

[8] Gertrude Robinson, "News Selection in Yugoslavia's News Agency, JOURNALISM QUARTERLY, 47: 340-351 (Summer, 1970); Pero Ivacic, "The Flow of News, Tajung, the Pool and the National Agencies," Journal of Communication, 28: 157-162 (Autumn, 1978); H.R. Jolliffe, "Developing Journalism in an Emergent Nation - Afghanistan," JOURNALISM QUARTERLY, 39: 355-362 (Summer, 1962); Paul B. Snider, "Experiences of a Journalism Teacher in Afghanistan," JOURNALISM QUARTERLY, 45: 316-38 (Summer, 1968).

[9] Selig Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit through Finland?" Foreign Policy, 41: 163-187 (Winter - 1980-81); Juri Valenta, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion, I-IV, Baltimore Sun, February 18, 1980, pp. 11, 18, February 19, 1980, p. 19, February 20, 1980, p. 23, February 21, 1980, p. 19; Economist, (April 19, 1979), p. 65; Economist, (Nov. 17, 1979), p. 65.

[10] Jolliffe, op. cit., pp. 355-362; Snider, op. cit., pp. 316-318.

[11] Jolliffe, op. cit., pp. 355-362; Snider, op. cit., pp. 316-318.

[12] Harrison, op. cit., pp. 163-170.

[13] Ibid., pp. 163-170.

[14] Valenta, op. cit., February 18, 1980, pp. 11, 18.

[15] Harrison, op. cit., p. 164.

[16] Valenta, op. cit., February 21, p. 19.

[17] Harrison, op. cit., p. 170-178.

[18] Ibid., pp. 170-178.

[19] Ibid., pp. 170-178.

[20] Valenta, op. cit., February 20, p. 23; Economist, op. cit., November 17, 1979, p. 68.

[21] Robert Moss, "Reaching for Oil, The Soviets' Bold Mideast Strategy," Saturday Review, (April 12, 1980), pp. 14-22.

[22] Ibid., pp. 14-22.

[23] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[24] Strobe Talbott, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse," Foreign Affairs 58:517-518 (Winter, 1979-80).

[25] Harrison, op. cit., pp. 180-187;

[26] Valenta, op. cit., February 21, 1980, p. 19

[27] Ibid., February 21, 1980, p. 19; Harrison, op. cit., 180-187.

[28] U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports - Middle East and North Africa, September 11, 1979-January 8, 1980. Dates chosen were the same as editions of Kabul Times.

[29] Harrison, op. cit., pp. 163-187.

[30] John C. Merrill, Ralph Lowenstein. Media Messages and Men (New York: Longman, 1979), pp. 193-201, 208-24; John C. Merrill, "How Time Stereotyped Three U.S. Presidents," JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 42:563-570 (Autumn, 1965).

[31] Ibid., 563-570.

[32] Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, Lewis Donohew. Content Analysis of Communication (New York: MacMillan, 1967), pp. 53-54.

[33] Coefficient of reliability formula is reported in Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Science and Humanities (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 140. The formula used in this study was:

$$\text{Coefficient of Reliability} = \frac{6M}{N1+N2+N3+N4+N5+N6}$$

Where: M=average number of coding decisions on which all coders agreed. N1+N2+N3+N4+N5+N6= number of coding decisions made by the six judges

34 x^2 or Chi Square calculations and levels of significance were computed with the formula and tables described in James McClane and Frank Dietrich, Statistics (San Francisco: Dellen Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 458, 653.

35 Personal Communication with Juri Valenta and graduate assistants in the program of Soviet and East European Studies, Department of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., June 2, 1980.

36 Morris Janowitz, "Content Analysis and the Study of Sociopolitical Change," Journal of Communication, 26:10-21 (Autumn, 1976).